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Abstract—Femtocells are small cellular telecommunication
base stations that provide improved cellular coverage. These
devices provide important improvements in coverage, battery
life and throughput, they also present security challenges. We
identify a problem which has not been identified in previous
studies of femtocell security: rogue owners of femtocells can
secretly monitor third-party mobile devices by using the fem-
tocell’s access control features. We present traffic analysis of
real femtocell traces and demonstrate the ability to monitor
mobile devices through classification of the femtocell’s encrypted
backhaul traffic. We also consider the femtocell’s power usage
and status LEDs as other side channels that provide information
on the femtocell’s operation. We conclude by presenting suitable
solutions to overcome this problem.
Index Terms—Femtocell, security, traffic analysis, cellular
devices, rogue owners.
I. INTRODUCTION
Femtocells allow operators to provide improved coverage
in a cellular network by providing low-power base stations
which can be installed in homes and offices. The standard-
isation and security of femtocells has received considerable
attention recently [1], [2]. The femtocell uses a customer’s
broadband connection to backhaul traffic to the mobile op-
erator’s network. Accordingly, this creates security concerns,
and consequently femtocells use security protocols such as
IPsec [3], which encrypt IP traffic that is sent to or from
the Mobile Network Operator (MNO). Customers may also
be concerned about a third party’s device connecting to their
femtocell, because, for example, the customer typically pays
for the backhauled traffic. Consequently, femtocells have an
access list (ACL) feature whereby only cellular devices with
phone numbers from a configurable set can connect. This is
sometimes referred to as a closed access femtocell [4].
In this paper, we consider the prospect that a malicious
customer, Mallory, uses their femtocell to monitor mobile
devices, belonging to a third party, Alice. By adding a device
to Mallory’s femtocell’s ACL, Mallory can secretly allow
Alice’s device to backhaul traffic through Mallory’s network
without Alice’s knowledge. While this traffic will be encrypted
and authenticated, IPsec does not provide protection against
traffic analysis, and so Mallory will be able to make certain
inferences about the mobile device. For example, Alice might
be Mallory’s neighbour, and by adding Alice’s phone to
the ACL for Mallory’s femtocell, Mallory can attempt to
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identify when Alice makes calls, by observing patterns in the
encrypted traffic. In such an attack, the femtocell now acts
like a rogue femtocell, because Mallory controls the network
used for backhaul, and therefore can capture the traffic, albeit
in encrypted format. This attack can occur without Alice’s
knowledge or consent. In contrast to other recent attacks on
femtocells [5], this requires no modification of the femtocell’s
hardware or software.
Femtocell security was considered during its standardisation
[1], [6], however issues still remain [2], [4], [7]. In [8]
the authors classify a number of attacks on femtocells. The
attack we describe here has similarities to attack 5 (man-
in-the-middle) listed in [6], [8]. However, our attack differs
in a significant way, because it is entirely passive and not
foiled by authentication of the femtocell or the application of
cryptography to communication between the femtocell and the
MNO’s network. While traffic analysis has been considered
on the air interface, traffic analysis of the backhaul network
is easier to achieve, and requires no specialist equipment. A
computer and an Ethernet hub, or similar device, are sufficient
to perform traffic analysis. From the literature, it appears that
this new attack has not been studied before or included in
previous classifications of attacks on femtocells. As this attack
was not identified during standardisation or documented in the
literature, it seems likely that femtocell deployments are not
being secured against this attack.
Fig. 1 illustrates the system architecture, showing how the
femtocell that is to be subject to traffic analysis integrates
into the cellular network. Again, note that this set-up does
not require any attack on the femtocell device (hardware)
itself, instead packets to and from the femtocell are passively
monitored. This traffic is labelled as DST (destination) and
SRC (source), respectively. Likewise, monitoring of the fem-
tocell’s power usage or status LEDs is passive and requires no
modification of the femtocell.
In the following sections, we demonstrate this attack using
traffic traces from a live femtocell. We identify basic traffic
characteristics that can be used in the traffic analysis. Using
these, we derive features that can identify common activities
of mobile devices, such as sending SMS (short message
service) messages, making calls, web activity, etc. We then
demonstrate that by using multiple femtocells we can correlate
calls and so potentially identify who is involved in the calls.
We also consider power usage and the femtocell’s status
LEDs as sources of additional information. Finally, we propose
solutions to mitigate this problem.
2Fig. 1. Rogue femtocell setup, showing integration into the mobile network.
II. ANALYSIS OF SINGLE FEMTOCELL TRAFFIC
In this section, we first describe our basic experimental
setup. Then we look at the features available to us for traffic
analysis of the backhauled traffic from a single femtocell,
and show how these relate to the activity of a device on
the femtocell. Finally, we show a simple scheme for traffic
classification based on these features.
A. Experimental Setup
The femtocell is an Alcatel-Lucent 9361 Home Cell V2-V. It
has a 3G radio interface and connects to a customer’s network
using standard Ethernet. It was connected to a residential
router running FreeBSD, and traffic to/from the femtocell was
collected using the tcpdump tool. This femtocell uses IPsec-
over-UDP to communicate with the mobile operator’s network.
It also generates a small amount of non-encrypted traffic,
including NTP time-synchronisation packets and traffic similar
to a traceroute. The analysis herein focuses on encrypted
traffic. When the femtocell is idle, there are 1–3 packets per
second (PPS) of encrypted traffic. Using the femtocell’s ACL,
we restrict its use to a single device, a Nokia X6 smartphone.
Test Procedure: To demonstrate the attack, we generate five
different types of traffic using a phone connected to the
femtocell. Four types of traffic are generated by using the
phone for SMS messages, MMS messages, phone calls and
web browsing. The last type is generated by taking actions
that relate to the network (e.g. moving the device outside the
coverage range of the femtocell, turning the phone on/off, . . . ).
We recorded timestamps for the start and end of the activities.
These timestamps represent ground-truth for the events up to
some small gap between, say, pressing “off” and the phone
powering down. We describe our analysis of the packet traces,
in comparison to the logged events.
B. Traffic Features
We consider three sources of information for the traffic
analysis. The first is traffic timing information, as we record
accurate timestamps for the arrival of each packet. We expect
that, for example, during a voice call we will see frequent
packet transmissions. The second source of information we
consider is packet size. We expect to see small packets for
a voice call or an SMS message, while web-browsing or
multimedia messages (MMS) tend to generate large packets.
The final source of information that we consider is the IP Type
Of Service (TOS) field (or Differentiated Services Code Point).
This field indicates if the packet wants special treatment from
the network (e.g. Expedited Forwarding), and so cannot be
encrypted. We expect that voice packets may request higher
priority handling than, say, an SMS message.
Figure 2(a) shows the number of packets per second re-
ceived/sent by the femtocell over a traffic trace. The number
is calculated using bins covering a duration of 5s. The recorded
timestamps for various events, such as the start/end of calls,
start/end of web browsing, sending of messages, etc. are
shown using stem plots below the axis. The plots show a
good correspondence between the activities and the number
of packets sent. As we expect, events such as web browsing
or calls correspond to high PPS rates, and other events cause
small but noticeable increases above the baseline. Note that not
all the network management events, such as joining/leaving
the cell, cause a change in the number of packets per second.
In some cases a delay is observed: powering on a phone
may result in network activity several seconds later. This may
be because the phone does not immediately connect to the
femtocell after booting.
Figure 2(b) shows the size of packets sent over time.
A clear data signature is present here, showing that during
web browsing a significant number of large packets are sent
and received. Similarly, as we expect, there is a pattern of
large packets being sent but not received when an MMS is
transmitted. There is also a clear pattern in the packet sizes
being sent at the start of each call, during each call and when
an SMS is sent. This is highlighted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Close-up of packet sizes that are produced during a phone call.
Moving to Figure 2(c), which shows the frequency of
particular TOS values over 10s intervals. Visual inspection of
these feature shows strong correlation between the different
data classes and TOS activity. For example, the TOS SRC 72
feature shows strong activity for the start and end of phone
calls, TOS SRC 184 shows strong activity during calls and
TOS DST 0 shows strong activity for phone calls and web
browsing. Other values don’t show an obvious correlation with
the events, e.g. TOS SRC 192 has a periodic nature, possibly
indicating that this is used for network monitoring or reporting.
C. Automatic Classification
Based on our findings, we devised a threshold-based classi-
fication algorithm operating on 10s intervals, without keeping
3(a) Packets per second vs. time for traffic to the femtocell (above) and from the femtocell (below), calculated with 5s bins.
(b) Packet size vs. time for packet to the femtocell (above) and from the femtocell (below).
(c) TOS field labels frequency vs. time for packet to/from the femtocell. 10s bins.
Fig. 2. Features identified for Traffic Analysis. Bin sizes are selected to provide clear features.
state between intervals. Threshold values were inferred from
empirical observations of real data traces. Pseudocode for this
algorithm is shown in Figure 4. The algorithm begins by
discarding certain background traffic, based on packet size and
TOS. It then looks for signatures for each activity based on
numbers of packets with particular size and TOS.
Comparison of the output of the algorithm and the logged
list of events indicates that even this simple algorithm can
4for each (10s interval) {
Remove background traffic (size, TOS, direction)
Count number_of packets for each (TOS, direction)
Store largest packet size for each (TOS, direction)
if (number_of (TOS 184,SRC) packets > 1)
event "Call in progress";
if (number_of (TOS 0,SRC) packets > 0) {
if (largest (TOS 0, SRC|DST) > 800)
event "Web session in progress";
else if (largest (TOS 0, DST) > 800)
event "Recv MMS in progress";
else if (largest (TOS 0, SRC) > 800)
event "Send MMS in progress";
else
event "Small Data/MMS in progress";
}
if (number_of (TOS 74) > 0 &&
number_of (TOS 0|72|184, SRC) == 0)
event "Signaling or SMS";
}
Fig. 4. Stateless algorithm for classification of activity.
identify when events occur and can identify events with good
accuracy, despite some ambiguity between Signaling/SMS,
Web/MMS and pre-call signaling/SMS. The ambiguity around
Web/MMS and signaling around a call can be resolved eas-
ily by looking at a series of 10s intervals. Resolving the
signaling/SMS ambiguity may be more challenging, as SMS
messages are a specialised form of signaling in some networks.
A small number of events are not identified, however these
events appear to generate little or no traffic (e.g. leaving the
femtocell’s coverage area). With these provisos, over 15000s
of trace we can correctly identify over 35 events with only
one false positive.
We have established that using features such as PPS, Packet
Size and TOS values collectively, it is possible to classify
the majority of events. While specific details of these might
change in a different femtocell implementation, our analysis
suggests that the attack will remain feasible. It is not difficult to
postulate a supervised or unsupervised classification algorithm
to automatically classify the cellular activities.
III. TWO FEMTOCELL TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider traffic analysis, where the
attacker has access to two femtocells and monitors both, to
observe temporal correlations of traffic. Though more chal-
lenging for an attacker, this could be used to to identify when
pairs of target users are in communication.
Our experimental setup is similar to that in Section II,
except that we now monitor two femtocells, which we label
Femto 1 and Femto 2, for a period of approximately one
hour. Monitoring takes place at two distinct routers, whose
clocks are synchronised by NTP. In this experiment, the
phones in use at both ends are Apple iPhone 3Gs. A series
of SMS/Calls/MMSes are made between a user at Femtocell
1 to either a user at Femtocell 2, or users external to these
femtocells. A list of events is recorded at Femto 1, with
approximate timestamps shown in Table I.
When we remove the background traffic, the time history of
packet sizes sent from Femto 2 or packets sent to Femto 1 is
shown in Figure 5. We plot the packets at Femto 1 above the
Time Event
0 SMS with internal and External
160 SMS with between Femto 1 & 2
200 Web browsing at Femto 1
270 Call from Femto 1 to External
390 Call from Femto 1 to Femto 2
540 SMS from Femto 1 to External
700 SMS to Femto 1 from External
1060 SMS from Femto 1 to External
1100 Send MMS and SMS from Femto 1 to Femto 2
1280 SMS from Femto 2 to Femto 1
2690 Call from Femto 1 to Femto 2
2820 SMS to Femto 1 from External
3280 Call from Femto 1 to External
TABLE I
EVENTS RECORDED AT FEMTO 1, WITH APPROXIMATE TIMESTAMPS.
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Fig. 5. Time history of packet sizes and TOS from Femto 2 and to Femto
1. The sizes of packets observed at Femto 1 are shown above the axis and
Femto 2 are shown below the axis.
axis, and those at Femto 2 below the axis, so a comparison
can be drawn without the points being overlaid. Though not
shown here, time histories for packets from Femto 1 and to
Femto 2 show similar features.
If we look at the events listed in Table I, we see that for
events just involving Femto 1, there is only traffic above the
axis. For events involving both Femto 1 and 2, there is similar
traffic observed at both Femtocells. For example, at around
270s we see a number of large packets at Femto 1, but no
traffic at Femto 2. This corresponds to a call at Femto 1 to an
external number. Similarly, just before 500s, we see a period
with a long stream of QoS-marked packets at both Femto 1 and
Femto 2. This corresponds to a call through both femtocells.
We use the classifier from Figure 4 to identify the activity in
both Femtocells and then align the classified intervals. We find
that the classifier identifies all events recorded at Femto 1, plus
a small number of additional events at Femto 2 (for example, a
short data session at about 2380s). The events which involve
both Femto 1 and Femto 2 are identified at both ends, and
show strong temporal correlation.
While this demonstrates that it is easy to identify calls and
other events that are common to both femtocells, over a long
period, it is easy to imagine that there will be some false
positives. However, using finer details of each event, it may
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Fig. 6. Time history of packet sizes and TOS from Femto 2 and to Femto
1 during a call. The sizes of packets observed at Femto 1 are shown above
the axis and Femto 2 are shown below the axis.
be possible to eliminate these false positives. For example,
Figure 6 shows the time history of the call which ends just
before 500s. We can see that once the call is fully established
around 405s, there is a strong correlation between the packet
sizes sent from Femto 2 and received at Femto 1. This pattern
is unlikely to be present if we had matched two unrelated
calls which happened to be contemporaneous. This allows us
to identify calls between pairs of users with high confidence.
IV. OTHER SIDE CHANNELS
Beyond traffic analysis, other side channels can be used to
make inferences about the femtocell, which do not require any
modifications. While traffic analysis provides rich information
about activity on the femtocell, other side channels could be
used in the absence of traffic information, or to complement
traffic analysis. The two sources of side information we
consider here are power usage and the status LED.
A. Power consumption
In this section we consider a single femtocell, as described
in Section II. We now monitor power usage at the DC input
on the femtocell using an Energino [9]. The Energino is an
Arduino-based device developed by CREATE-NET which pro-
vides fine-grained high-resolution energy usage measurements.
It powers a device over a standard DC jack and requires no
modification of the monitored device.
Figure 7 shows time histories of power usage of the fem-
tocell when (1) the femtocell is booting; (2) the femto cell is
idle; (3) one call is active; (4) two calls are active and (5) a
data transfer is in progress. Note, gaps are shown between each
time history as the five time histories were not contiguous.
While power usage in situation 3 (one call) and 4 (two calls)
are similar, otherwise there is a significant difference in mean
power usage of at least 0.1W (at 95% confidence). As the
variance of the power usage is small after boot time, it would
be possible to use hypothesis testing to classify the activity on
the device. A more complete model of femtocell power usage
is built in [10]. We conclude that the presence and absence of
calls could be determined using power measurements alone.
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
Po
w
er
 (W
)
Time (s)
Power consumption of femtocell under different conditions
Booting
Idle
One Voice Call
Two Voice Calls
FTP Transfer
Fig. 7. Power usage of the femtocell under different conditions.
Fig. 8. Status LEDs. Above, LEDs show power and connection to the MNO
are available. Below, device is using the femtocell for call or data session.
B. Status LEDs
A number of status LEDs are present on the femtocell,
including two Ethernet LEDs, a power LED, a system LED
and a phone LED. Figure 8 shows the latter three LEDs. The
documentation indicates that the system LED is lit when a
connection has been established to the MNO. This seems to
indicate that the IPsec session has been established and higher-
layer communication is in progress.
Again, the documentation indicates that the phone LED is lit
when a phone is in use. In practice, it seems to be lit whenever
a device using the femtocell has an active voice/data session
with the femtocell. When used in combination with the fem-
tocell’s ACL, this LED allows us to determine with certainty
if a device on the access list is in range. Though limited,
this information could be combined with traffic analysis to
eliminate false identification of events.
V. DISCUSSION
While we have focused here on identifying types of activity,
we note that there have been recent advances in attacks on
encrypted voice over IP. For example, in certain circumstances
the size of packets from a codec that compresses voice can
be used to identify spoken phrases [11]. Such an attack could
be applied in a femtocell setup. Another extension is to go
6beyond a passive traffic analysis attack by actively generating
traffic, say by calling the monitored device, to determine if it
is in range of the femtocell. The monitoring described here
could also be a prelude to an active attack.
We have seen that monitoring the temporal correlation of
traffic at multiple femtocells could also be used to identify
pairs of target users that are in communication. Such relatively
minor extensions of our basic attack highlight its potential se-
riousness with respect to users’ privacy. For example, consider
two celebrities, whose phone numbers may be known by the
press. By setting up femtocells near each celebrity’s residence,
an attacker can determine when calls and SMS exchanges take
place between them, resulting in a significant loss of privacy.
These problems arise because although the femtocell’s
owner has authorised a device to use the femtocell, the device’s
owner has not authorised the device to connect via the femto-
cell. In WiFi networks, this problem is known as the rogue
access point problem [12]. When we informally surveyed
a number of femtocell offerings, we found no evidence of
systems that require authorisation from devices’ users. Note
that the ACL feature actually exacerbates the problem, because
it allows targeting of devices. By restricting access to the
femtocell to targetted devices, the attacker can eliminate traffic
from other, uninteresting, cellular devices in the vicinity. This
means that we only have to consider one device per-femtocell,
which simplifies the use of traffic analysis or side channels.
Given the seriousness of this attack, it seems important to
provide protection against such traffic analysis. Since seamless
integration is important for femtocell deployment, any solution
must be either transparent to the users or simple to use, as
zero touch installation is target feature of femtocells [4]. We
propose three approaches to mitigate such attacks.
Mitigation Option “Dummy Traffic”: One option is for the
femtocell to continuously generate traffic. However, generating
dummy traffic that does not leak any information about a user’s
activity could be challenging.
Mitigation Option “IMEI/IMSI Verification”: An alternative
is to make it harder to add a device to the femtocell’s ACL
without having legitimate access to the device. A basic ACL
just requires knowledge of the devices cell phone number.
Requiring additional details, such as the International Mobile
Equipment Identity (IMEI) or International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI) number, increases the barrier to maliciously
adding a device. The IMEI number, which identifies the
device, is easily accessible on most devices and MNOs, and
users are familiar with the idea of using it for blacklisting
stolen phones, for example. However, if access to the femtocell
is tied both to the phone number and the IMEI, the user will
have to update the femto’s ACL whenever they change their
device. The IMSI, which identifies the device’s user via the
SIM card, seems like a better match. However, in practice the
IMSI number is not as broadly accessible on devices and is
not commonly used by end users.
Mitigation Option “User Verification”: This option explicitly
checks that the device’s user wants to use the femtocell. When
a user is added to a femtocell’s ACL, an SMS message could
be sent to the user saying “You have been added to Mallory’s
femtocell. If you trust Mallory and want to use the femtocell,
reply to this text.” In general, users are already familiar with
such explicit opt-in texts. Subsequent management of the list
of opt-in femtocells could be provided via a web interface.
These mitigation techniques provide protection against our
passive attacks, though they are not effective against an
attacker who modifies the femtocell’s hardware or software
[2], [5], [13]. The Dummy Traffic option is unlikely to be
a practical solution to the passive attacks, as it is waste-
ful of backhaul resources and would be less likely to be
accepted by consumers who are paying for data backhaul.
Using IMEI/IMSI Verification or explicit User Verification
both require the user to interact with their phone, and might
be subject to to social engineering attacks or circumvented
if the attacker has temporary access to the device. Overall,
we believe User Verification would offer a good trade-off
between usability and security for most users and addresses the
fundamental issue of the user consenting to use the femtocell.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that femtocells can pose a significant
privacy risk through monitoring of targetted third party cellular
devices. This shortcoming has been overlooked in the litera-
ture. Using empirical data analysis of real femtocell traffic,
we show how to classify between different user activities. We
also consider power usage and status LEDs as an additional
source of information. Lastly, we have proposed solutions to
mitigate against this security problem.
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